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Stonyhurst Philosophical Series, General Metaphysics wrote: The conclusion is that we are neither pessimists nor optomists; that we
admit evil, but not any essentially evil principle: that we maintain every
Being as such, to be good, yet so that out of the interrelations of finite
perfections evil may ensue for want of the power of mutual
accommodation. When evil does thes result the badness itself is neither a
positive Being, nor a positive activity of being; it is the privation of some
perfection, the absence of a good that is needful. Moral evil because of
the peculiar nature of free-will, which does not act simply with the
mathematical necessity of it's nature, presents special difficulties in the
way of the reduction of evil to a privation; but to these we have paid no
special attention because they belong to another treatise. We are
content to point out that there is a distinction between the physical evil
which results from intrinsically and separately good agencies, working
according to the rigorous necessities of their nature, and that evil which is
not chargeable upon nature, but upon the responsibility of the individual
who may use or abuse his powers at will.
